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Security Using RF-DNA Fingerprints and SVM
Donald Reising, Joseph Cancelleri, T. Daniel Loveless, Farah Kandah, and Anthony Skjellum
Abstract—It is estimated that the number of IoT devices
will reach 75 billion in the next five years. Most of those
currently, and to be deployed, lack sufficient security to protect
themselves and their networks from attack by malicious IoT
devices that masquerade as authorized devices to circumvent
digital authentication approaches. This work presents a PHY
layer IoT authentication approach capable of addressing this
critical security need through the use of feature reduced Radio
Frequency-Distinct Native Attributes (RF-DNA) fingerprints and
Support Vector Machines (SVM). This work successfully demon-
strates 100%: (i) authorized ID verification across three trials of
six randomly chosen radios at signal-to-noise ratios greater than
or equal to 6 dB, and (ii) rejection of all rogue radio ID spoofing
attacks at signal-to-noise ratios greater than or equal to 3 dB
using RF-DNA fingerprints whose features are selected using the
Relief-F algorithm.
Index Terms—IoT Security, RF Fingerprinting, Support Vector
Machines, Feature Selection, Radio ID Authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
T
HE Internet of Things (IoT) is a collection of semi-
autonomous, Internet connected devices comprised of
inexpensive computing, networking, sensing, and actuation ca-
pabilities for sensing and acting within the physical world [1].
The number of deployed IoT devices continues to explode
annually and is estimated to reach roughly 75 billion by
2025 [2]–[4]. Alarmingly 70% of all IoT devices do not
employ encryption due to: (i) limited on-board computational
capability, (ii) being too expensive for the manufacturer to
implement, and (iii) scalability issues associated with imple-
mentation and management [5], [6]. This makes them, and the
associated infrastructure, susceptible to attack by devices that
are incorrectly authenticated as legitimate, when in fact they
are not, due their use of compromised digital credentials that
are transmitted in clear text. There is a critical need for an
IoT security approach capable of defeating attacks in which
illegitimate devices digitally masquerade as authorized IoT
devices to circumvent digital authentication approaches. The
need is exacerbated as bad actors exploit this weakness to
conduct attacks against IoT infrastructure [7]–[14].
Recently, the physical (PHY) layer approach known as
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Specific Emitter Identification (SEI) has been put forward as a
solution capable of addressing this critical IoT need [15], [16].
One specific SEI implementation, known as Radio Frequency
(RF) fingerprinting, facilitates radio discrimination by exploit-
ing the unintentional ‘coloration’ that is inherently imparted
upon a radio’s waveform during its generation and transmis-
sion [17]–[54]. The cause of this radio specific coloration is
assigned to the inherent and distinct characteristics as well as
interactions associated with the devices and components that
make up a radio’s RF front-end. The fact that RF fingerprint
features are inherent and unique to a given radio makes them
difficult to imitate; thus, making security approaches based
upon them very difficult to bypass [55], [56].
The majority of RF fingerprinting work has focused on radio
classification (a.k.a., identification) [17]–[44], [52]. In classifi-
cation, an unknown radio’s identity is determined through the
comparison of its RF fingerprint(s) with each of the stored,
reference models that represent the authorized/known radios;
thus, representing a “one-to-many” comparison. The radio
identity associated with the reference model that results in
the “best” match is said to be the originator of the RF finger-
print(s). The flaw in classification is that class assignment, in
this case the radio assigned as the RF fingerprint originator,
is made no matter how poor this “best” match is. This flaw
can result in the granting of network access to rogue radios.
As defined in [49], a rogue radio is one that intentionally
falsifies its digital credentials, e.g., compromised passwords or
encryption keys, spoofed MAC addresses or equivalent digital
identities, to match that of an authorized radio to bypass digital
security mechanisms.
The flaw of radio classification has led to the proposal
of a “one-to-one” comparison known as radio identity (ID)
verification (a.k.a., authentication) [15], [30], [45]–[49], [51]–
[54]. In radio ID verification the RF fingerprint(s) of the
unknown radio are compared only to the stored reference
model associated with the presented digital ID [49]. Thus, the
unknown radio’s ID is either verified as that of an authorized
radio or rejected as a rogue. In the presence of rogue radios,
radio ID verification results in four possible outcomes, which
were introduced in [49] and are presented in Table I.
In this work, we present a radio ID verification-based IoT
TABLE I: Identity Verification Outcomes [49].
System Declaration
Actual ID Authorized Rogue
Authorized True Verification (TVR) False Reject (FRR)
Rogue False Verification (FVR) True Reject (TRR)
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security approach using RF-Distinct Native Attributes (RF-
DNA) fingerprints and Support Vector Machines (SVM). Our
work differs from prior RF fingerprinting-based ID verification
approaches in that feature selection is: (i) assessed using eight
different techniques and (ii) driven by the authorized radio
whose ID is to be verified. The latter is based upon the one-to-
one nature of radio ID verification, which allows the RF-DNA
fingerprints to differ in composition and number of features
from one authorized radio to another. The key is that prior
to feature selection, the RF-DNA fingerprints of every radio,
i.e., authorized and rogue, are generated to be comprised of
the same set of features. Lastly, ‘best’ SVM model selection
is performed using a novel approach that does not require any
knowledge of the rogue radios’ RF-DNA fingerprints.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First,
a description of the adopted threat model is presented in Sec-
tion II. Section III provides a summary of prior RF fingerprint-
based ID verification publications. The contributions of this
work to the RF fingerprint-based ID verification state-of-the-
art is presented in Section IV. Section V outlines each stage
within the presented ID verification process: signal collection,
detection, and post-processing (Sect. V-A), RF-DNA finger-
print generation (Sect. V-B), SVM (Sect. V-D), selection of the
‘best’ SVM model (Sect. V-E), as well as the ID verification
approach (Sect. V-F). The Methodology is followed by the
ID verification and rogue rejection performance results and
analysis in Section VI, which includes assessment of the de-
veloped approach using the eight feature selection approaches
(Sect. VI-A) and under degrading channel noise conditions
(Sect. VI-B). Lastly, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. THREAT MODEL
The threat model adopted in this work is informed by the
prior RF-DNA fingerprinting work in [47], [49], [50] as well
as the threat models presented in [57], [58]. In this work, the
adversary leverages commercially available IoT and compute
devices to conduct their attack upon an IoT infrastructure. It is
assumed that the adversary has either the knowledge or access
to simple software applications that enable them to modify the
settings of their associated IoT device and compute devices
necessary to conduct their attack [58]. The adversary is not an
authorized user of the targeted IoT infrastructure; thus, they do
not inherently have access to its wireless network(s) nor the
individual IoT and support devices that form the infrastructure.
Lastly, it is assumed that the IoT infrastructure communication
links and hardware are not compromised.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the particular IoT attack
of interest within this work. The adversary, a.k.a., Eve, is able
to gain access to the IoT infrastructure by exploiting the lack of
encryption or easily circumvents an incorrectly implemented
encryption process. Once encryption is bypassed, Eve is then
authenticated by ‘Bob’, an authorized IoT device or IoT in-
frastructure monitoring device, by presenting the compromised
digital credentials, e.g., MAC address, International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (IMSI), of another authorized IoT device,
a.k.a., ‘Alice’. Following authentication, Eve is granted access
to the IoT infrastructure and is able to: observe, spoof, inject,
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Fig. 1: Threat Model: Lacking encryption, the rogue device
‘Eve’ is able to trick ‘Bob’, another authorized IoT device
or IoT infrastructure monitor, that she is the authorized IoT
device ‘Alice’ by presenting Alice’s digital ID credentials.
remove, and alter data in real-time as well as spoof the ID of
other authorized IoT devices.
III. RELATED WORK
This section highlights the contributions and differences of
previous RF fingerprint-based ID verification works.
In [47], RF-DNA fingerprint-based radio ID verification is
performed using nine IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee radios, seven
authorized and two rogue, Fisher-based feature selection, and a
probabilistic-based verification approach. Using a FVR≤10%,
eleven out of fourteen rogue attacks, i.e., each rogue spoofs the
ID of each authorized radio, were detected at a signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) of 10 dB. The goal is to achieve a FVR≤10%
for all fourteen rogue radio attacks. In [47], the models used
for radio authentication are developed for the purpose of
classification and not verification, which presents a potential
reason for the poorer rogue radio rejection performance.
A rogue radio rejection process based upon the k-Nearest
Neighbor (KNN) classifier is presented in [48]. The presented
approach achieves an accuracy from a low of 30% up to 94%
at SNR=15 dB. KNN suffers from: (i) high outlier sensitivity,
(ii) lacks kernel functions that aid in handling nonlinear data,
(iii) requiring hyperparameters that are precisely fine tuned
to achieve optimal results, and (iv) being poorly suited to
unpredictable cases.
In [49], RF-DNA fingerprints are used to verify the iden-
tity of Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
(WiMAX) radios in the presence of rogue radio attacks. Near-
transient signals are collected from a total of eighteen WiMAX
radios of the same manufacturer and model. The eighteen
WiMAX radios are divided into three trials of six each. For a
given trial, the remaining twelve radios serve as the rogues for
that trial, which results in a total of 72 rogue radio attacks per
trial. For the three trials, the highest number of rejected rogue
radio attacks are 67 of 72 at a TRR≥90% and SNR=21 dB.
In an effort to reject all rogue radio attacks, a fourth trial
was selected. This fourth trial consisted of eight radios and
successfully rejected all rogue radio attacks at SNR=21 dB. As
in [47], the models and RF-DNA fingerprint feature selection
was performed to maximize classification performance.
The work in [50] performs radio ID verification of Zig-
Bee radios using RF-DNA fingerprints and verification ap-
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proaches using test metrics from three classifiers: Ran-
dom Forest (RndF), Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum
Likelihood (MDA/ML), and Generalized Relevance Learn-
ing Vector Quantization-Improved (GRLVQI). The RndF and
MDA/ML-based approaches use posterior probability, while
the GRLVQI-based verification approach uses the angle-
distance metric from [49]. The authors in [50] perform feature
selection using the: (i) feature importance ranking built-in to
the RndF classifier, (ii) Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and (iii)
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) first presented in [49].
Radio ID verification and rogue rejection is conducted using
a total of thirteen ZigBee radios in which four are designated
as authorized radios and the remaining nine assigned to
serve as rogue radios; thus, representing a total of thirty six
rogue attacks, i.e., each rogue spoofs the digital ID of each
authorized radio. For a TRR≥90%, 31 of 36 (∼86%) rogue
radio spoofing attacks are rejected using DRA selected features
and RndF-based radio ID verification at an SNR=12 dB.
As with the RF-DNA fingerprint-based work in [47], [49],
the work in [50] performs radio ID verification and rogue
rejection using selected features and authorized radio models
originally developed for the purpose of performing “one-to-
many” classification, which may have contributed to the poorer
rogue radio rejection performance.
In [15], rogue attacks on IoT and commercial home automa-
tion systems are detected through the use of Slope-Based Fre-
quency Shift Keyed (SB-FSK) fingerprints and a MDA/ML-
based ID verification process. The attacks are carried out by
like-model Insteon Switch (IS) devices as well as YARD Stick
One Software Defined Radios (SDRs). At an SNR=15 dB, a
total of 25 IS and 36 YARD Stick One SDR rogue attacks
are successfully rejected for a TRR=95% (FVR=5%) and
TRR=100% (FVR=0%), respectively. As in [47], [49], [50],
the work in [15] relies upon features and machine learning
models that are optimized for classification not ID verification
performance.
SVM-based ID verification, using RF fingerprints drawn
from the preambles of the Random Access Channel (RACH)
waveforms, of five 3GPP UMTS mobile radios is presented
in [45]. For ID verification, SVM is employed using both
a single and ensemble-based approach. For ensemble-based
ID verification three configurations are used: tiered, weighted
tiered, and double weighted tiered. All of the ensemble-based
approaches are implemented using a two class SVM in which
each class represents a single radio. This approach requires
the development of an SVM model for all possible paired
combinations. Given radios A, B, and C, SVM models are
developed for pairs: (A and B), (B and C), and (A and C).
For the case when a radio presents the digital credentials of
A, then its corresponding RF fingerprints are compared with
two SVM models: (A and B) and (A and C). Verification of
the radio’s ID is dependent upon which ensemble approach is
selected, but all three consider the class decision returned by
each SVM model.
In [52], ID verification is presented using Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNN) and RF fingerprints learned from the
waveforms of seven IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee compliant radios.
Similar to the work in [54] as well as this work, the work
in [52] performs ID verification using a two class model in
which one class represents the authorized radio, whose ID is
to be verified, and the other represents all remaining known
radios, i.e., the not A case. Therefore, a total of seven CNNs
are trained to perform ID verification. The use of CNN is
more computationally and temporally complex than SVM. An
average TVR=92.7% is achieved at an SNR=10 dB while
individual ID verification results are not presented.
The work in [54] presents IoT device authentication im-
plemented via radio ID verification, as described in Sect. I,
using RF-DNA fingerprints extracted from the near-transient
responses of eighteen IEEE 802.16e WiMAX radios, the DRA
feature selection approach from [49], and an SVM classifier.
Six WiMAX radios were designated as authorized radios
and the remaining twelve used as rogue radios. An SVM
model is developed for each of the six authorized radios
using the RF-DNA fingerprints for all authorized WiMAX
radios, where class one represents the radio whose digital ID
needs verification, and class two represents the remaining five
authorized WiMAX radios. The presented approach performed
well in verifying the ID of five out of the six authorized
radios while rejecting the rogue radios at a rate of 91% or
better SNR≥9 dB. However, for the sixth authorized radio
roughly 88% of the rogue radios’ transmissions were verified,
i.e., FVR=88%, as having originated from this sixth radio at
SNR=9 dB. The FVR did not improve with increased SNR,
which suggests that the issue lies either with the DRA feature
selection approach and/or the SVM classifier. In [54], the DRA
features were not chosen for the purpose of verifying the ID
of a given authorized radio in mind, but to optimize one-to-
many classification performance.
A Mobile IoT (MIoT) device ID verification approach using
RF fingerprints and Support Vector Data Description (SVDD)
is presented in [59]. The approach uses Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) followed by Neighborhood Component Anal-
ysis (NCA) to generate the RF fingerprint features from the
instantaneous amplitude envelope of the power-on transient
signals collected from ten Motorola A12 radios. The presented
approach achieves TVR∈[86, 96]% across five authorized
radio trials at an SNR=15 dB. Each trial is comprised of eight
authorized radios to facilitate rogue radio rejection assessment
using that trial’s two remaining radios. The results in [59]
achieve FVR∈[6, 9]% for the rogue radios across the five trials
at SNR=15 dB. In [59]: (i) the RF fingerprints are extracted
from the signal’s instantaneous amplitude that is negatively
affected by noise, (ii) only a single feature selection approach
is considered, (iii) the RF fingerprints of every radio are
comprised of the same number of features, and (iv) TVR≥90%
requires a SNR≥20 dB.
IV. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In comparison to our approach, prior publications present
results generated using: (i) a single feature selection approach,
(ii) a set of RF fingerprint features that remain fixed in
both number and composition across all authorized and rogue
radios, (iii) machine learning models that are developed to
maximize classification and not ID verification performance,
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TABLE II: List of Notations.
ND Number of radios used in this work NB Number of collected signals per radio NO Order of the Butterworth filter
Gmk Complex Gabor Transform Coefficients M Total number of time shifts N∆ Step size between Gabor calculations
KG Total number of frequency shifts NP
Total patches in the time-frequency
plane
NT Size of a patch in time
NF Size of a patch in frequency Pt f
A single patch in the time-frequency
plane
σ Standard deviation
σ2 Variance γ Skewness κ Kurtosis
N f Number of RF-DNA fingerprint features λ DRA feature relevance vector f A single RF-DNA fingerprint
F A set of RF-DNA fingerprints w A projection matrix ci The ith SVM class
Nt .i Training fingerprints of class i Nτ Total number of training fingerprints F¯
A set of normalized RF-DNA finger-
prints
e Eigenvectors λe Eigenvalues Nr Number of retained fingerprint features
wr Weight assigned to feature r Br Bhattacharyya coefficient of feature r NB Number of histogram bins
F
Set of RF-DNA fingerprints with class
labels
Υ A kernel function ρ Vector of Probability of Error values
α Average Correlation Coefficient values wρ Probability of Error weight wα Average Correlation Coefficient weight
t Statistic produced by the t-test NK Number of Relief-F nearest neighbors f˜ Randomly chosen RF-DNA fingerprint
fH Relief-F nearest hit fingerprint fM Relief-F nearest miss fingerprint β An SVM support vector
and (iv) threshold-driven performance. The work presented
herein provides the following contributions to the area of SEI-
based IoT security:
1) Feature selection is performed with ID verification in
mind; thus, the number and particular RF-DNA fingerprint
features retained are allowed to differ from one authorized
radio to another. The use of the same set of features,
for every authorized radio, overlooks the specific features
that make a given authorized radio unique, which impedes
ID verification and rogue rejection performance as SNR
degrades.
2) SVM model development is performed for the sole purpose
of performing ID verification and rogue rejection for a
given authorized radio. Therefore, the SVM is trained
using a two class approach where: class 1 represents the
authorized radio whose ID needs to be verified and class 2
represents all other radios both rogues and remaining au-
thorized radios. During SVM training, class 2 is developed
using the RF-DNA fingerprints of all remaining authorized
radios, i.e., those authorized radios whose ID is not being
verified, to serve as a representative sample of possible
rogue radios.
3) ID verification and rogue radio rejection performance is
assessed using eight feature selection approaches.
4) A novel approach for selecting the SVM model that is
‘best’ suited to simultaneously maximizing authorized ra-
dio ID verification and rogue radio rejection performance
without any knowledge of the rogue radiosâA˘Z´ RF-DNA
fingerprints.
5) ID verification and rogue radio rejection performance does
not require the setting of a threshold. Threshold-based
approaches require a trade-off between the rate at which
the authorized radios’ IDs are verified and rogue radios
are rejected. So, increasing the ID verification rate requires
sacrificing rogue rejection performance and vice versa. This
dependency between the verification and rejection rates
leads to degraded performance at lower SNR values.
6) Comparative assessment is facilitated by adopting the
TVR≥90% and FVR≤10% benchmarks used in [15],
[47], [49], [50], [54]. The goal is for the developed RF
fingerprint-based ID verification approach to satisfy both
of these benchmarks at the lowest SNR possible.
These contributions result in an average TVR=97.8% at an
SNR=6 dB while rejecting all rogue radio attacks at an
FVR≤10% for SNR≥3 dB, which is unseen in published
literature.
V. OUR METHODOLOGY
Our proposed ID verification approach is carried out through
the use of six consecutive phases, which are: (i) signal col-
lection, detection & post-processing, (ii) RF-DNA fingerprint
generation, (iii) feature selection, (iv) SVM model develop-
ment, (v) SVM model selection for ID verification under rogue
radio attacks, and (iv) the ID verification approach.
A. Signal Collection, Detection, and Post-Processing
This section provides a brief explanation of the process used
to: (i) collect the signals from each of the eighteen WiMAX
radios, (ii) separate individual transmissions from the overall
collection record, and (iii) prepare the detected transmissions
for RF-DNA fingerprint generation.
RF-DNA fingerprints are drawn from the near-transient
response present at the start of each range-only transmission
generated by a WiMAX Mobile Subscriber (MS) radio within
the up-link sub-frame. A representative illustration of this near-
transient response is shown in Fig. 2. Use of the WiMAX near-
transient is due to the use of the on-hand data set in [49], [54],
which enables comparative analysis.
The near-transient responses of ND=18 Alvarion Breeze-
MAX Extreme 5000 802.16e WiMAX MS radios are collected
using an Agilent spectrum analyzer. The spectrum analyzer: (i)
has an RF bandwidth of 36 MHz, (ii) operates over the range
of frequencies from 20 MHz to 6 GHz, (iii) has a maximum
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Fig. 2: Representative “near-transient” response from a
WiMAX MS radio’s range-only transmission within the up-
link sub-frame [49].
sampling rate of 95 mega-sample/s, and a 12-bit analog-to-
digital converter [60]. Amplitude-based variance trajectory
detection was used to select a total of NB=1, 000 near-transient
responses for each of the WiMAX MS radios [25]. All
detected near-transient responses are filtered using a NO=6th
order Butterworth filter and the In-phase and Quadrature (IQ)
samples stored for RF-DNA fingerprint generation.
B. RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation
In this section, the process used for generating an RF-
DNA fingerprint, from a given collected signal, is explained.
RF-DNA fingerprints are generated from the WiMAX near-
transient response’s time-frequency (TF) representation, which
is calculated using the Discrete Gabor Transform (DGT) [61].
Use of the DGT is due to its: (i) computational complexity
being proportional to the sampling rate, (ii) robustness to
degrading SNR when the calculation is over-sampled, and (iii)
demonstrated success in prior RF-DNA fingerprinting work
[49], [54], which facilitates comparative assessment. For all
results presented in Sect. VI, the DGT is calculated by,
Gmk =
MN∆∑
n=1
s(n + lMN∆)ν
∗(n − mN∆)exp
−j2pikn/KG , (1)
where Gmk are Gabor coefficients, s(n) is the near-transient re-
sponse, ν(n) is a Gaussian analysis window, m=1, 2, . . . ,M for
M total shifts along the time dimension, and k=0, 1, . . . ,KG −
1. Selection of M, N∆, and KG must result in the modulus
of (MN∆) and KG returning zero. For consistency with [49],
[54], the DGT is calculated with M=150, KG=150, and N∆=1,
which results in oversampling due to KG>N∆.
The RF-DNA fingerprints are extracted from the normal-
ized, magnitude-squaredGabor coefficients. The normalization
ensures that all values, within the resulting TF representation,
range between zero and one. Figure 3 shows the RF-DNA fin-
gerprint generation process. The normalized TF representation
is subdivided into NP=50 patches. Each patch is comprised of
NT=15 by NF=10 entries and is annotated as Pt f , where t and
f denotes a particular patch’s position within the TF response.
??
Fingerprint Elements
# Statistics × ??
?? ? ??? ×?? Samples/Patch? - Std Deviation?? - Variance? - Skewness? - Kurtosis
??,? ??,? ??,? ??,???,? ??,? ??,? ??,???,? ??,? ??,? ??,???,? ??,? ??,? ??,?
??,? ??,?
??,???,???,???,?
??,?
??,??? ?
Fig. 3: Illustration of Gabor-based RF-DNA fingerprint genera-
tion using NT×NF two-dimensional patches extracted from the
centered, normalized magnitude-squared Gabor coefficients.
Following selection of a particular patch, it is reshaped into a
NT×NF=150 length vector and the features: standard deviation
(σ), variance (σ2), skewness (γ), and kurtosis (κ) calculated.
This process is repeated for all patches and subsequent features
are appended to the end of those calculated from previous
patches. Additionally, these features are calculated for the
entire normalized TF representation and added as the final
four features of the RF-DNA fingerprint. Thus, each RF-DNA
fingerprint is comprised of Nf =204 total features.
C. Feature Selection Approaches
This work investigates eight feature selection techniques:
DRA, Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), PCA, NCA,
Probability Of Error plus Average Correlation Coefficient
(POEACC), Bhattacharyya Coefficient (BC), t-test, and Relief-
F [30], [62]–[68]. The features that comprise an RF-DNA
fingerprint are the statistics, i.e., variance, standard devi-
ation, skewness, kurtosis, calculated from the normalized,
magnitude-squared Gabor response as described in Sec-
tion V-B. Feature selection is performed for each authorized
radio with the goal of maximizing the TVR while simulta-
neously minimizing the FVR. This is facilitated by allowing
the number of retained features Nr as well as which features
are selected to vary from one authorized radio’s set of RF-
DNA fingerprints to another. The number of retained features
Nr is chosen to be the fewest that result in a TVR≥90% and
FVR≤10%. The remainder of this section explains the feature
selection process for each of the eight selected approaches.
1) Dimensional Reduction Analysis: DRA is a feature
selection approach first introduced in [30] and leveraged
in [49], [54] to reduce the dimensionality of the RF-DNA
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fingerprints prior to radio ID verification. DRA selects the
most relevant features based upon the values contained in
the feature relevance vector, λ, which is generated as part of
the GRLQVI classifier’s training phase. At a given SNR, the
relevance vector is,
λ(SNR) =
[
λ1, λ2, . . . , λN f
]
, (2)
where λj∈[0, 1] indicates how much feature j influences the
classification decision. If λj>λk , then feature j is more influ-
ential on the classification decision than that of feature k. For
the presented results, feature selection is performed on a per
SNR basis using the feature relevance vector corresponding to
the GRLVQI classification model learned at that SNR.
2) Linear Discriminant Analysis: LDA is a linear operation
that projects the Nf−dimensional RF-DNA fingerprints onto a
line that results in the greatest separation of the two classes of
interest. In this work, the two classes are the set of RF-DNA
fingerprints corresponding to: (i) the authorized radio (c1),
whose ID is to be verified, and (ii) all other authorized radios
(c2) that serve as representatives of all other WiMAX radios
including rogues. The RF-DNA fingerprints are projected onto
the line by,
Fw = w
T
F, (3)
F =
[
f
c1
1
, f
c1
2
, . . . , f
c1
Nt,1
, . . . , f
c2
1
, f
c2
2
, . . . , f
c2
Nt,2
]T
Nτ×N f
, (4)
where f is an Nf −dimensional RF-DNA fingerprint belonging
to class c1 or c2, Nt,i is the total number of RF-DNA
fingerprints in the training set of class i, Nτ=(Nt,1 + Nt,2),
and the superscript T denotes transpose. The projection w is,
w = S
−1
w (µ1 − µ2), (5)
where
µi =
1
Nt,i
∑
f∈Fi
f, i = [1, 2], (6)
Sw =
∑
f∈F1
(f − µ1)(f − µ1)
T
+
∑
f∈F2
(f − µ2)(f − µ2)
T, (7)
and Sw is the within-class scatter matrix [62].
3) Principle Component Analysis: PCA is an alternate
feature space transformation that reduces dimensionality for
the purpose of finding those components most useful for
representing the data [62]. The PCA transformation is a series
of projections that are mutually uncorrelated and ordered,
from largest to smallest, in variance; thus, the principal axis
is aligned along the direction associated with the largest
variance [69]. The principal components are the eigenvectors
of the covariance matrix as calculated by,
Σ
F¯
=
1
Nτ
F¯ · F¯T , (8)
where F¯ is a matrix defined as:
F¯ = F −
[
µ
c1
1
, µ
c1
2
, . . . , µ
c1
Nt,1
, . . . , µ
c2
1
, . . . , µ
c2
Nt,2
]T
Nτ×N f
, (9)
where µj is the mean of the j th RF-DNA fingerprint, and
i=[1, 2] [69]. The eigenvectors, i.e., principal components, are,
(Σ
F¯
− λeI)e = 0, (10)
where I is the identity matrix, e is the eigenvectors, and λe
the eigenvalues [70]. A solution to (10) is found by solving
the characteristic equation,
|Σ
F¯
− λeI| = 0, (11)
where | • | denotes the determinant [70]. The solution to (11)
is the eigenvectors for the covariance matrix Σ
F¯
and the prin-
cipal components are obtained by ordering the eigenvectors,
with respect to their associated eigenvalues, from largest to
smallest. There are a total of Nf eigenvectors and Nr of
them are retained to reduce the dimensionality of the RF-DNA
fingerprints. Prior to ID verification, the RF-DNA-fingerprints
are projected into the PCA defined space by,
Fw = F¯ · PNr , (12)
where PNr is a matrix comprised of the first Nr eigenvectors
associated with the Nr largest eigenvalues.
4) Neighborhood Component Analysis: NCA is a nearest
neighbor-based feature selection approach that maximizes the
‘Leave-One-Out’ classification accuracy [71]. Let the training
set of RF-DNA fingerprints and the corresponding class label
ci be defined as,
FNτ×(N f +1) =
[
fi,r , ci
]
, (13)
where i=[1, 2], and r=1, 2, . . . , Nf . In NCA, an RF-DNA
fingerprint is randomly selected from F and is designated
as the reference fj . The probability that a new RF-DNA
fingerprint fi is assigned the same class label as fj is,
pij =
k
(
dw(fi, fj )
)
Nτ∑
j=1, j,i
k
(
dw(fi, fj )
) , (14)
where
dw
(
fi, fj
)
=
N f∑
r=1
w
2
r
 fir − fjr , (15)
Υ(z) = exp
(
−
z
ψ
)
, (16)
Υ is the kernel function, ψ=1 is the kernel width, and wr
is the weight assigned to the r th feature. The goal is to find
the value of each weight wr such that the chosen subset of
RF-DNA fingerprints produces the highest nearest-neighbor
classification accuracy [71]. The weight vector w, that achieves
this goal, is determined by,
wˆ = argmin
w

1
Nτ
Nτ∑
i=1
Nτ∑
j=1, j,i
pij l
(
ci, cj
)
+ λR
N f∑
r=1
w
2
r
 , (17)
where,
l
(
ci, cj
)
=
{
1 if ci , cj
0 otherwise
, (18)
is the loss function, and λR is the regularization parameter,
which results in most of the weights in wˆ being set to zero. The
RF-DNA fingerprint features associated with the Nr largest
weights are retained and the remainder discarded.
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5) Probability Of Error & Average Correlation Coefficient:
POEACC is the weighted sum of the Probability Of Error
(POE) and Average Correlation Coefficient (ACC) feature
selection techniques. The r th RF-DNA fingerprint feature is
ranked as,
wr = wρ ρ¯ + wαα, (19)
where wρ and wα are weights that sum to 1 [64]. The POE
values are normalized according to,
ρ¯r =
ρr − ρmin
ρmax − ρmin
. (20)
where r = 1, . . . , Nf . The ACC is given by,
αr,q =
 Σr,qσrσq
 , (21)
where r and q are a pair of features, Σr,q is the covariance
of the training set of RF-DNA fingerprints, and σr as well
as σq are the standard deviations of the of the r th and qth
selected feature, respectively [72]. As with POE, the ACC is
normalized prior to selection of the r th feature, which ensures
that w1 and w2 remain a true measure of importance in (19).
In POEACC, the first feature selected is that which results
in the smallest normalized POE, i.e., smallest classification
error. The second feature chosen is that which results in the
smallest correlation value between itself and the first selected
feature. The third selected feature is that which results in the
smallest average correlation coefficient between itself and that
of the first two when compared with the average correlation
coefficients for all remaining features. This continues until all
Nf features have been assigned a wr value. Selection of the
r th feature is based upon its average correlation value with
respect to those previously chosen [64]. This work only uses
POEACC feature selection; thus, values of w1=0 and w1=1
are neglected as they represent feature selection based only
upon ACC or POE, respectively.
6) Bhattacharyya Coefficient: The BC facilitates feature
selection by providing a measure of the amount of overlap
that exists between histograms. This measure provides an
indication of the relative closeness of the histograms. The BC
for a given RF-DNA fingerprint feature fr is given by,
Br =
NB∑
b=1
√
Pc1 (b)Pc2(b), (22)
where NB is the number of ‘bins/buckets’ comprising the
histograms, Pc1 (b) is the probability of b for histogram c1,
and Pc2(b) is the probability of b for the histogram of c2
[62], [65]. The histogram Pc1(b) is constructed from the r
th
feature of the authorized radio whose ID is to be verified
while Pc2 (b) is constructed from the r
th feature associated with
the RF-DNA fingerprints of the remaining authorized radios.
If Br=0, then there is no overlap between the histograms
associated with feature fr . If Br=1, then the histograms
overlap completely for feature fr . For the work presented here,
each RF-DNA fingerprint is comprised of Nf =204 features
and a BC is calculated for each. The RF-DNA fingerprint
features corresponding to the smallest BC values are kept, as
they indicate the least amount of overlap between histograms,
and the remainder are discarded.
7) t-Test: In this work the Welch’s t-test is calculated for
each of the Nf RF-DNA fingerprint features. In the Welch’s
t-test the null hypothesis is tested when the two populations
have equal means, but unequal variances or sample sizes [73].
As with the Student’s t-test, the Welch’s t-test assumes the
two populations are distributed normally. This makes Welch’s
t-test well-suited to this work, because the: (i) number of RF-
DNA fingerprints comprising the data set differs between c1
and c2, i.e., unequal sample sizes, and (ii) channel noise is
normally distributed [66], [74]. For the Welch’s t-test the test
statistic is,
t = (µ1 − µ2)
(
σ2
1
Nt,1
+
σ2
2
Nt,2
)−1/2
, (23)
where µi is given by (6) and σi is the standard deviation
of the ith RF-DNA fingerprint training set. For the estimated
variance, the degrees of freedom v are approximated using the
Welch-Satterthwaite equation given by,
v ≈
(
σ2
1
Nt,1
+
σ2
2
Nt,2
)2 (
σ4
1
v1N
2
t,1
+
σ4
2
v2N
2
t,2
)−1
(24)
where vi=Nt,i−1 for i=[1, 2] [67]. RF-DNA fingerprint features
for which the null hypothesis is rejected are retained, while
the rest are discarded. The retained features are ordered from
the smallest to largest probability of observing a t value equal
to or larger than that associated with the current value.
8) Relief-F: Relief-F extends the Relief algorithm to ac-
count for: missing values, noisy data, and more than two
classes [68]. It is for the first two reasons that Relief-F feature
selection is used here. Relief-F uses an iterative approach
to determine the quality of each RF-DNA fingerprint feature
using within feature dimension distances between the selected
RF-DNA fingerprint and its NK nearest in-class (a.k.a., nearest
hit) and NK out-of-class (a.k.a., nearest miss) neighbors [75],
[76]. The weight assigned to the r th feature is iteratively
updated by,
wr = w
′
r −
NK∑
k=1
∆r
(
f˜, fk
H
)
NτNK
+
∑
cj,ci
NK∑
k=1
pcj
1 − pci
∆r
(
f˜, fk
M
)
NτNK
, (25)
where w′r is the previous weight value of the r
th feature, f˜
is the RF-DNA fingerprint randomly selected from the set of
Nτ training fingerprints, fkH is one of the NK nearest hits to
f˜, fk
M
is one of the NK nearest misses to f˜, pci is the prior
probability of the class to which f˜ belongs, pcj is the prior
probability of the class to which fk
M
belongs, and
∆r
(
f˜, fkδ
)
=
f˜(r) − fk
δ
(r)

max
{
f˜(r), fk
δ
(r)
}
−min
{
f˜(r), fk
δ
(r)
} , (26)
where δ=[H,M] selects nearest hits and misses [77], [78]. The
retained features are ordered from the largest assigned weight
value wr to the smallest.
D. Support Vector Machines
This section briefly explains the SVM machine learning
algorithm. In SVM, the goal is to determine the separating
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hyper-plane with the largest margin. The larger the margin,
then the greater the generality of the classifier [62]. The opti-
mal hyper-plane is defined by the support vectors, which are
the RF-DNA fingerprints that are the most difficult to classify
within the training set. Separation of both classes’ RF-DNA
fingerprints is facilitated through their non-linear mapping into
a much higher dimensional space. When sufficiently high, this
mapping always facilitates separation of the two classes by a
hyper-plane [62].
For the non-separable case, the SVM is defined as,
min
β,β0
1
2
| |β| |2 + C
Nτ∑
i=1
ξi, ξi ≥ 0, (27)
ξi ≥ 1 − yi
(
f
T
i β + β0
)
, ∀i, (28)
where
(
f
T
i β + β0
)
defines the hyper-plane, yi∈[−1, 1], β is a
unit vector such that half the margin is (1/||β| |), ξi is a ‘slack’
variable that accounts for RF-DNA fingerprints that fall on the
wrong side of the margin, and C is a “cost” parameter used
to tune the function and is set to one for all results presented
in Section VI. The primal Lagrange function is given as,
LP =
1
2
| |β| |2 + C
Nτ∑
i=1
ξi −
Nτ∑
i=1
µiξi
− C
Nτ∑
i=1
αi
[
yi(f
T
i β + β0) − (1 − ξi)
]
,
(29)
which is minimized with respect to β, β0, and αi . The
derivatives of (29) are set to zero to obtain,
β =
Nτ∑
i=1
αiyifi, (30)
where
∑Nτ
i=1
αi yi=0, and αi=C− µi . Substituting (30) into (29)
results in the Lagrangian dual objective function,
LD =
Nτ∑
i=1
αi −
1
2
Nτ∑
i=1
Nτ∑
j=1
αiαj yiyjΥ (f, f
′), (31)
where Υ (f, f ′) maps the RF-DNA fingerprints into the higher
dimensional space. In this work, the Radial Basis Function
(RBF) is used for this non-linear mapping, which is given by,
Υ (f, f ′) = exp
(
−ζ | |f − f ′| |2
)
, (32)
where ζ is a positive constant, f and f ′ are two RF-DNA
fingerprints [69]. The solutions to (29) and (31) are found by
minimizing β, β0, and αi and are given by,
βˆ =
Nτ∑
i=1
αˆiyifi, (33)
where the support vectors βˆ are the RF-DNA fingerprints
for which αˆi,0. Support vectors on the edge of the margin
have values of 0≤αˆi≤C and ξi=0. All remaining support
vectors have αˆi=C and ξi>0. Based upon these constraints
and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions in [69], then the SVM
decision is,
Sˆ (f) = sign
[
f βˆ + βˆ0
]
, (34)
(a) Margin PMFs for a model selected for ID verification.
(b) Margin PMFs for a model not selected for ID verification.
Fig. 4: Representative PMFs of the margin values using two
different SVM models generated for the same authorized radio
and SNR, i.e., a different set of retained RF-DNA fingerprint
features are used.
where ‘sign[•]’ assigns a −1 or 1 to an RF-DNA fingerprint
based upon its location with respect to the margin.
As in [52], [54], radio ID verification is implemented using
a two class classifier. One class represents the authorized radio
whose ID is to be verified, while the second serves to represent
all other radios including rogues. During SVM training, this
second class is represented using the RF-DNA fingerprints of
the remaining authorized radios.
E. SVM Model Selection
This section provides an explanation of the process devel-
oped to select the SVM model ‘best’ suited to maximize ID
verification and rogue radio rejection performance. One of
the challenges in ID verification is the selection of a model
that is well-suited to not only verification of the authorized
radio’s ID, but also rejection of rogue radios masquerading
as the authorized radio without having access to their RF-
DNA fingerprints during model development. The selection of
the “best” SVM model, i.e., the one that achieves the highest
simultaneous ID verification and rogue rejection performance,
is predicated on achieving a TVR≥90% for the authorized
radio, whose ID is to be verified, and an FVR≤10% for the
remaining known radios that serve as representative rogues.
Thus, if either of these two benchmarks is not satisfied for
the selected SVM model, then that SVM model is removed
from consideration. If there is no SVM model that satisfies this
TVR requirement for a given authorized radio at a particular
SNR across all Nr retained feature sets, then the SVM model
that achieves the highest TVR value for that authorized radio
is selected. For SVM models that satisfy the TVR≥90%
requirement, the margin is calculated for all of the RF-DNA
fingerprints of the authorized radio being verified and the
remaining authorized radios, designated herein in as ‘others’,
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across all noise realizations at the selected SNR and Nr
features. The margin is calculated by,
m = 2y f
(
f1×Nr
)
, (35)
f
(
f1×Nr
)
=
Nτ∑
j=1
αˆj yjG
(
βˆj, f1×Nr
)
+ βˆ0, (36)
where
(
αˆ1, . . . , αˆNT , βˆ0
)
are the estimated SVM parameters,
yj∈[−1, 1], and G
(
βˆj, f1×Nr
)
is the dot product between the
selected RF-DNA fingerprint and the support vectors [79].
Following calculation of the all of the margin values, the
Probability Mass Function (PMF) is generated for the positive,
i.e., the authorized radio, and negative, i.e., the others, classes.
The mean and variance of each PMF is calculated along with
the BC value using (22). At a given SNR, the SVM model
resulting in the largest distance between the PMFs’ mean
values as well as the smallest BC and variance values is
selected as the “best” model for ID verification and rogue
rejection using the prescribed set of Nr features. Figure 4
provides a representative illustration of the two margin PMFs
for two different SVM models. In this case, the SVM models
are generated for the same authorized radio at the same SNR,
but using RF-DNA fingerprints comprised of differing sets of
retained features in both those selected and number. The SVM
model that resulted in the PMFs shown in Fig. 4(a) would be
selected for ID verification and rogue radio rejection, while
the SVM model associated with Fig. 4(b) would not.
F. ID Verification Approach
As stated in Sect. V-A, a total of ND=18WiMAXMS radios
are used in this work; thus, ID verification with rogue radio
rejection assessment is facilitated by dividing the eighteen
radios into two sets: (i) an authorized set of six radios and (ii)
a set of twelve to serve as rogue radios. Selection of the six
authorized radios was done randomly, while ensuring that each
radio is designated as an authorized radio once and a rogue
twice. The result is three separate trials of six authorized and
twelve rogue radios. The composition of each trial’s authorized
radios is given in Table III and is consistent with that of [49]
to enable comparative assessment. For example, to verify the
ID of MS63A7, in Trial #1, then class one of the SVM is
trained using MS63A7’s RF-DNA fingerprints while class two
training is done using the RF-DNA fingerprints of MS63A9,
MS66E7, MS6373, MS6387, and MSD905. The remaining
twelve radios, i.e., Trial #2 and #3 authorized radios, serve
as rogues attempting to gain network access by spoofing the
digital ID of MS63A7. This process is repeated for each
authorized radio of a given trial and across all three trials.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, the developed ID verification and rogues
radio rejection process, which uses feature reduced RF-DNA
fingerprints and a two class SVM, is evaluated for its effec-
tiveness in mitigating the threat as described in Sect. II. All
ID verification and rogue radio rejection results are generated
TABLE III: WiMAX Authorized Device Trials [49].
Trial #
1 2 3
Digital ID #
MS63A7 MS637D MSC2FF
MS63A9 MS9993 MSDAC5
MS66E7 MSDAB9 MSDDC7
MS6373 MSDAC9 MSDF5B
MS6387 MSDADB MSDF7D
MSD905 MSDDBF MSDF65
using SVM models that are developed following the approach
described in Sect. V-F. For a given SNR value, an authorized
radio’s SVM model is developed using Monte Carlo simulation
that is enabled through the use of Nz=10 independent, like-
filtered AWGN realizations being added to every radio’s near-
transient responses prior to RF-DNA fingerprint generation.
The SVM classifier is trained using k=5-fold cross validation
and Nb=900 Nr -dimensional RF-DNA fingerprints for each
of the authorized radios; thus, class one and two are repre-
sented using 900 and 5,400 RF-DNA fingerprints, respectively.
Each feature selection approach, with the exception of LDA,
designates the Nr∈[1, 200] top ranked RF-DNA fingerprint
features as described in Sect. V-C1 through Sect. V-C8. For
each authorized radio, a total of k×Nz=50 SVM models are
generated at each value of Nr ; thus, the model that results in
the smallest classification error, across all Monte Carlo trials
and k-fold steps, is used to represent the selected authorized
radio at the particular value of Nr . The authorized radio’s
“best” SVM model, across all values of Nr , is chosen using
the procedure presented in Sect. V-E.
A. Evaluation of the Feature Selection Approaches
The purpose of this section is to determine the feature
selection method(s) that are most effective in choosing the set
and number of retained RF-DNA fingerprint features based
on ID verification and rogue rejection performance. For the
authorized radio, whose ID is to be verified, the “best” ID
verification performance is defined as achieving a TVR≥90%,
while the “best” rogue rejection performance is achieving an
FVR≤10% for all rogue radios and the remaining authorized
radios, i.e., those whose ID is not being verified by the selected
SVM model. The feature selection method(s) that simulta-
neously achieves both of these conditions, for all authorized
radios, is used for SNR-based analysis.
The effectiveness of each feature selection method is as-
sessed using the authorized radios of Trial #1 at SNR=21 dB.
Selection of this trial and SNR is motivated by the pub-
lished results in [49], which presents ID verification and
rogue radio rejection performance using the exact same: set
of Nf -dimensional RF-DNA fingerprints, noise realizations,
authorized and rogue radios, as well as SNR value.
Our results are presented in Fig. 5, the ID verification
for each of the six authorized radios comprising Trial #1
at SNR=21 dB. For authorized radio MS63A7, shown in
Fig. 5(a), a TVR=100% is achieved using RF-DNA fingerprint
features selected using all eight feature selection approaches.
The other five authorized radios, i.e., MS63A9, MS66E7,
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Fig. 5: ID verification (◦) and rogue rejection (×) performance for the six authorized radios of Trial #1 using all eight feature
selection methods at SNR=21 dB. The number of retained features is in parentheses along the x-axis and “Others ()” indicates
the five authorized radios whose ID is not being verified.
MS6373, MS6387, and MSD905, are successfully rejected at
a FVR<10% using the features selected by all eight methods.
The digital ID spoofing attacks by the rogue radios, i.e.,
those comprising Trials #2 and #3, are successfully rejected
at an FVR<10% using: DCA, PCA, NCA, POEACC, BC, t-
test, and Relief-F selected features. LDA selected RF-DNA
features fail to satisfy the FVR≤10% requirement for five of
the twelve total digital ID spoofing attacks. The worst case
being a rogue radio that achieves a successful attack rate of
∼53%, i.e., granted network access, when spoofing the digital
ID of MS63A7.
ID verification and rogue radio rejection results for each of
the eight feature selection approaches is presented in Fig. 5(b)
for the authorized radio MS63A9. The ID of MS63A9 is
successfully verified at a TVR≥90% using the features desig-
nated by all eight selection methods. The other five authorized
radios are all successfully rejected at an FVR≤2% regardless
of the feature selection method used. For rogue radio rejection,
RF-DNA fingerprints comprised of LDA and PCA selected
features fail to achieve the required FVR≤10% benchmark for
all twelve rogue radio attacks. For PCA selected features, two
rogues are granted network access at rates of over 96% and as
high as 99%. This means that these two rogue radios are vir-
tually indistinguishable from the authorized radio, MS63A9,
when presenting its digital ID and PCA is used to select the
RF-DNA fingerprint features.
The ID verification and rogue rejection results for MS66E7
are presented in Fig. 5(c). The ID of MS66E7 is successfully
verified using RF-DNA fingerprint features selected by each
of the eight methods described in Sect. V-C. The feature
reduced RF-DNA fingerprints of the other authorized radios
are successfully rejected at an FVR≤3% for all eight feature
selection methods. The rejection performance of the other
authorized radios is important to prevent anyone of them from
being incorrectly verified as the authorized radio whose ID is
being verified. Two of the rogue radios are falsely verified, as
MS66E7, at rates of 25% and 45% when the retained RF-DNA
fingerprint features are chosen using LDA.
The ID verification and rogue rejection performance for
authorized radio MS6373 is shown in Fig. 5(d). The ID of
MS6373 is successfully verified at a TVR≥90% using RF-
DNA fingerprints whose features are selected using the: DRA,
LDA, NCA, POEACC, BC, t-test, and Relief-F, methods.
When using PCA selected RF-DNA fingerprint features, the
ID of MS6373 is verified 78% of the time. The remaining
authorized radios are all successfully rejected at an FVR≤7%
when using any one of the eight methods to reduce RF-
DNA fingerprint dimensionality. For MS6373, all twelve rogue
radio attacks are successfully rejected when using: DRA,
NCA, POEACC, BC, t-test or Relief-F reduced RF-DNA
fingerprints. When using LDA and PCA reduced RF-DNA
fingerprints a total of 5 and 6 rogue radios are incorrectly
verified as radio MS6373 at a FVR≥90%, respectively. LDA
assumes that the discriminating information is contained in the
class means; thus, the poorer rogue rejection performance is
attributed to violation of this assumption [62]. In PCA-based
feature selection, it is assumed that the principle components
are: (i) linear combinations of the original features comprising
the RF-DNA fingerprint(s), (ii) orthogonal, and (iii) associated
with the axes of highest variance [62]. If one or more of these
assumptions do not hold, then PCA will fail to select a set of
RF-DNA fingerprint features that facilitates separation of one
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Fig. 6: ID verification (◦) and rogue rejection (×) performance for the six authorized radios of all three trials using the POEACC
and Relief-F feature selection methods at SNR=9 dB. The x-axis labels indicate the claimed digital ID with the number of
retained features in parentheses and “Others ()” indicates the five authorized radios whose ID is not being verified.
or more rogue radios from the authorized radio whose ID is
being verified by the developed SVM model.
MS6387 ID verification and rogue rejection performance
is presented in Fig. 5(e). The ID of MS6387 is successfully
verified at a TVR≥90% using all eight retained RF-DNA
fingerprint feature sets. An FVR≤2% is achieved for the other
authorized radios. However, rogue rejection using: DRA, LDA,
and PCA selected RF-DNA fingerprint features fails to achieve
the required FVR≤10% benchmark for: 3, 8, and 4 of the
twelve rogue attacks, respectively. For LDA, two of the rogue
radios’ ID’s are verified as that of MS6387 at an FVR=[92,
100]%.
Figure 5(f) shows that the ID of MSD905 is verified at
a TVR≥98%, while the other authorized radios are correctly
rejected at an FVR≤1%. For rogue radios spoofing the ID
of MSD905, the required FVR≤10% is achieved using the
top ranked RF-DNA fingerprint features selected using five,
i.e., DRA, NCA, POEACC, t-test, and Relief-F, of the eight
methods. The worst case rogue rejection performance is an
FVR=100%, which results when using LDA selected RF-DNA
fingerprint features.
Considering the ID verification results, in Fig. 5, across the
six authorized radios of Trial #1, the required TVR≥90% and
FVR≤10% benchmarks are achieved using Nr -dimensional
RF-DNA fingerprints whose top features are ranked using:
NCA, POEACC, t-test, and Relief-F. The remaining four
feature selection methods, i.e., DRA, LDA, PCA, and BC,
fail to satisfy one or both of the requisite benchmarks for
at least one of the six authorized radio ID verification sce-
narios. The worst case occurs when using LDA reduced RF-
DNA fingerprints, which fails to achieve the rogue rejection
FVR≤10% requirement for all six authorized radio ID ver-
ification scenarios. LDA’s poor performance is attributed to
the projection itself, because it assumes that the two classes
are linearly separable. If the two classes are not linearly
separable, then LDA cannot discriminate between them [80].
The LDA projection reduces the Nf=204-dimensional RF-
DNA fingerprints onto one-dimension, which leaves very little,
if any, discriminating information for discerning the RF-DNA
fingerprints of a rogue from that of the authorized radio.
In comparison to the results in [49], the DRA results shown
in Fig. 5 prove superior in that the ID of all six Trial #1
authorized radios is verified at a TVR≥90%. A total of 3 and
4 rogue radio attacks fail to be rejected at the FVR≤10%
benchmark in Fig. 5 and [49], respectively. The worst case
DRA-based rogue rejection performance in Fig. 5 is 87%
versus ∼50% in [49].
B. Evaluation of ID verification Under Degrading SNR
Based upon the results in Fig. 5, ID verification and rogue
rejection performance is assessed using Nr -dimensional RF-
DNA fingerprints whose top ranked features are selected using
the: NCA, POEACC, t-test, and Relief-F feature selection
methods under degrading SNR for all three trials in Table III.
The set of all Nf -dimensional RF-DNA fingerprints contains
SNR∈[-3, 27] dB in 3 dB steps; thus, the degrading SNR
assessment is conducted in 3 dB steps starting with 18 dB.
Initially, only the authorized radios of Trial #1 are used and
additional trials are assessed as long as the required TVR and
FVR benchmarks are satisfied for the previous trial(s). At the
selected SNR, a feature selection method is removed from
consideration if either the TVR≥90% is not met for any of
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(f) Trial #3 at SNR=3 dB.
Fig. 7: ID verification (◦) and rogue rejection (×) performance for the six authorized radios of all three trials using Relief-F
feature selection at SNR=[3, 6] dB. The x-axis labels indicate the claimed digital ID with the number of retained features in
parentheses and “Others ()” indicates the five authorized radios whose ID is not being verified.
the authorized radios being verified or the FVR≤10% is not
satisfied for the other authorized and rogue radios for any
one of the three trials. For SNR∈[12, 18] dB, all four of the
chosen feature selection approaches met the TVR and FVR
benchmarks for each trials’ set of authorized and rogue radios.
However, at SNR=9 dB, only POEACC and Relief-F se-
lected Nr RF-DNA fingerprint features achieve the TVR≥90%
and FVR≤10% benchmarks for all three authorized radio
trials, as shown in Fig. 6. The x-axis indicates the claimed
digital ID with the number of retained features in parentheses.
The SNR=9 dB results are presented for two reasons: (i)
many digital communication standards require a received sig-
nal SNR≥10 dB for reliable demodulation performance, e.g.,
IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi [81], and (ii) the results presented in [54]
are at SNR=9 dB, which permits comparative assessment. The
work in [54] only assessed ID verification and rogue rejection
performance for Trial #1 authorized radios. In [54], 4 of the
6 authorized radios have their ID verified at a TVR≥90%.
Rogue radio attacks are successfully rejected at FVR≤10%
when spoofing 5 of the 6 authorized radios’ digital IDs. When
spoofing the ID of MSD905, the 12 rogue radios are rejected
at an FVR=88%, which means that the SVM struggles to
differentiate a rogue radio from MSD905 when using the DRA
selected RF-DNA fingerprint features in [54].
Due the TVR and FVR performance results presented in
Fig. 6, ID verification and rogue rejection performance is
continued to be assessed for SNR=[3, 6] dB. However, for
these SNR values the POEACC selected Nr -dimensional RF-
DNA fingerprints no longer satisfied the selected TVR≥90%
and FVR≤10% benchmarks. Thus, ID verification and rogue
radio rejection results are only presented for Nr -dimensional
RF-DNA fingerprints whose features are selected using the
Relief-F technique, which are shown in Fig. 7.
The SNR=6 dB results are presented in Fig. 7(a), Fig. 7(b),
and Fig. 7(c) for Trial #1, Trial #2, and Trial #3, respec-
tively. For the SNR=6 dB case, the Relief-F selected Nr RF-
DNA fingerprint features achieve the required TVR≥90% and
FVR≤10% benchmarks for all authorized and rogue radios
across all three of the trials in Table III. The lowest TVR is
for MSDF7D of Trial #3 (Fig. 7(c)) with a rate of 93.2%. All
other authorized radios have their IDs verified at TVR>93.2%.
For each trial, a total of 72 total rogue radio spoofing attacks
occur, which are all successfully defeated at a FVR≤10%.
The SNR=3 dB results are shown for: Trial #1 in Fig. 7(d),
Trial #2 in Fig. 7(e), and Trial #3 in Fig. 7(f). For Trial
#1 the ID of all six authorized radios is correctly verified
at a TVR≥90%. The lowest true verification performance
occurring for radio MS66E7 at a TVR=91%. All rogue radios,
representing 12 spoofing attacks per authorized radio for
a total of 72, are successfully rejected at a FVR≤10% at
SNR=3 dB. Trial #1’s worst case rejection performance is at
an FVR=7.4%, which occurs when a rogue radio spoofs the ID
of the authorized radio MS6387. In terms of Trial #2 presented
in Fig. 7(e), the IDs of four out of the six authorized radios is
verified at a TVR≥90%. The two remaining radios, MS9993
and MSDADB, are verified at rates of 87.2% and 84.9%,
respectively. Despite these two authorized radios not being
verified at or above the selected TVR benchmark, all rogue
radios are still successfully rejected within the FVR≤10%
benchmark or better. Worst case rogue rejection performance
is an FVR=9.93% when the ID of authorized radio MSDDBF
is spoofed by one of the 12 rogue radios. For Trial #3
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in Fig. 7(f), the TVR≥90% benchmark is achieved when
verifying the ID of four out of the six authorized radios.
Authorized radios MSDAC5 and MSDF7D are verified at
TVR=87.2% and TVR=84.6%, respectively. Similar to Trial
#2, all of the rogue radio attacks on Trial #3 authorized radios
are successfully rejected at the desired FVR≤10% or lower.
Worst case rogue rejection performance is an FVR=10% when
the IDs of authorized radios: MSC2FF, MSDDC7, MSDF5B,
and MSDF65 are spoofed by a rogue radio. When considering
the results for Trial #2 and Trial #3, with respect to the threat
model presented in Sect. II, the ability to successfully reject
all of the rogue radio attacks, at the selected FVR benchmark,
is of greater import than verifying the IDs of all authorized
radios at the selected TVR≥90% benchmark. The success of
the Releif-F selected RF-DNA fingerprint features is attributed
to the algorithm’s use of the k nearest in-class and out-of-class
neighbors when determining the feature weights; thus, making
making it more robust under degrading SNR conditions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over the next five years the number of deployed IoT devices
is estimated to reach 75 billion. The vast majority of these
and current IoT devices lack robust security to protect them,
and the associated networks, from exploitation by nefarious
actors. This work presents a PHY layer IoT security approach
capable of defeating digital ID spoofing attacks through the
use of feature reduced RF-DNA fingerprints and an SVM
classifier. A total of eight feature selection approaches are
assessed to determine the RF-DNA fingerprint features that
facilitate authorized radio ID verification at a TVR≥90% while
simultaneously rejecting all rogue radio digital ID spoofing
attacks at a FVR≤10% at the lowest SNR possible. Unlike
prior works that use RF fingerprints formed using a fixed
number and/or composition of features for all authorized ra-
dios, this work allows the number and composition of selected
RF fingerprint features to be driven by individual authorized
radio ID verification performance. Selection is driven by the
distribution of the margin values generated from the SVM
model and the authorized radios’ Nr -dimensional RF-DNA
fingerprints, i.e., without knowledge of rogue radios’ RF-DNA
fingerprints. This work successfully demonstrates 100%: (i)
correct ID verification, i.e., TVR≥90%, across three trials of
six randomly selected authorized radios at SNR≥6dB, and
(ii) rejection, i.e., FVR≤10%, of 72 rogue radio ID spoofing
attacks per authorized radio SNR≥3dB using Nr -dimensional
RF-DNA fingerprints whose features are selected using the
Relief-F algorithm. Such performance is unseen in previous
RF fingerprint-based ID verification publications. Future work
will focus on ID verification and rogue radio rejection for
networks comprised of: (i) differing numbers of authorized
radios, and (ii) radios that are heterogeneous in manufacturer
and/or model.
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